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Abstract Project-based emissions trading schemes, like the Clean Development
Mechanism, are particularly prone to problems of asymmetric information between
project parties and the regulator. In this paper, we extend the general framework on
incomplete enforcement of policy instruments to reflect the particularities of credit-
based mechanisms. The main focus of the analysis is to determine the regulator’s
optimal spot-check frequency given plausible assumptions of incomplete enforcement
under asymmetric information on reduction costs and heterogeneous verifiability of
projects. We find that, depending on the actual abatement cost and penalty schemes,
optimal monitoring for credit-based systems is often discontinuous and significantly
differs from the one to be applied for cap-and-trade schemes or environmental taxes.
We conclude that, in a real-world context, project admission should ultimately be
based on the criterion of verifiability.
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1 Introduction
Project-based emissions trading schemes have recently increased in importance due
to the successful implementation of the Kyoto markets. These schemes allow project
developers, outside the regulation of cap-and-trade schemes, to sell their certified emis-
sion reductions on the cap-and-trade market. Indeed, credit-based mechanisms repre-
sent the only—although second-best—option to extend emissions trading to countries
unwilling to take on emission targets. This is particularly important as within the
current Kyoto architecture, these countries have the largest share of low-cost emis-
sion reductions. Yet project-based schemes, like the Clean Development Mechanism
(CDM), are particularly vulnerable to problems of incomplete enforcement. Informa-
tion asymmetries between the regulator and project developers create an incentive to
overstate emission offsets, sold on the market for emission rights. This problem is
often more severe under credit-based systems than standard market-based environ-
mental policy instruments, where cheating is reduced to a misrepresentation of actual
emissions. It is, therefore, natural to ask how the regulator determines optimal moni-
toring policy under a project-based system and how this policy compares to standard
market-based regulation.
To answer these questions, we develop an analytical model of a credit-based system
that takes potential overreporting of emission reductions into account. We focus on the
optimal decisions of the regulator, given the impossibility to fully enforce compliance,
under asymmetric information on reduction costs and heterogeneous verifiability of
projects. We show, given a limited monitoring budget, a rational regulator will com-
pletely refrain from monitoring those projects that are most difficult to verify. For larger
monitoring budgets, the optimal monitoring strategy can be discontinuous, featuring a
jump within the set of projects with lower verifiability. Furthermore, for those projects
in full compliance, the monitoring pressure reduces with increasing verifiability of
the projects. For cases with intermediate verifiability, optimal monitoring pressure is
ambiguous. For these levels of verifiability, we identify conditions for which moni-
toring pressure is either at its maximum or for which there exists a ‘U-shaped’-style
monitoring policy.
Given the importance of enforcing environmental policies, considerations of incom-
plete enforcement of instruments has become an important research field. Early
research mainly focused on the comparison of emission taxes and pollution stan-
dards. The first formal model on this issue was developed in Harford (1978), which
was extended in Harford (1987) to include self-reporting by firms. Within more recent
research the analyses were extended to the comparative performance of different envi-
ronmental policy instruments under incomplete enforcement. Schmutzler and Goulder
(1997) focus on the difference between emission taxes and output taxes. Macho-Stadler
and Perez-Castrillo (2006) analyze the optimal enforcement policy in the context of
per-unit emission taxes. Further analysis has also been conducted on cap-and-trade
programs (Keeler 1991; Macho-Stadler 2006; Malik 1990; Stranlund and Chavez
2000; Stranlund et al. 2005; Stranlund 2007).1
1 For literature surveys on environmental regulation, see Cohen (1999) and Heyes (2000).
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Yet, the literature on credit-based systems is sparse.2 To our knowledge, there exists
no formal model deriving optimal monitoring. This is particularly unfortunate in light
of the elevated potential for fraudulent misreporting within such schemes. Recently,
Macho-Stadler and Perez-Castrillo (2006) analyzed optimal monitoring policy under
an emissions tax, assuming the regulator’s objective is to minimize the spread between
actual emissions and their optimal level. They show that monitoring should be used for
the easiest-to-monitor firms as well as firms that value pollution less. Yet when consid-
ering credit-based mechanisms, the regulator’s objective is different. Not only does the
regulator want to minimize actual emissions but also the overstatement within projects’
reported emissions. Further, it is plausible that the regulator only has a rough notion
of the true cost of specific types of reduction projects. Our paper, therefore, extends
the analysis of regulating emitters with heterogeneous verifiability by Macho-Stadler
and Perez-Castrillo (2006) to include the monitoring of credit-based mechanisms with
asymmetric information over project cost.
The paper is structured as follows. In the following subsection the general problem
of opportunistic false reporting in credit-based systems is explained further. The pre-
sentation of the formal model starts with Sect. 2, where the abatement and reporting
decisions of a rational project developer are derived. Section 2.2 presents the optimal
monitoring policy of a regulator disposing of an unlimited budget. In Sect. 3, optimal
monitoring is analyzed under the more realistic assumption of a limited budget and
compares this to the case of tax regulation, while Sect. 4 extends the model to discuss
project admission. Section 5 has some concluding remarks.
1.1 Background
The basic idea of credit-based emissions trading is to incentivize emission reduc-
tions on a project-by-project basis. A prominent example is the Clean Development
Mechanism (CDM): a policy tool under the Kyoto Protocol that reduces greenhouse
gases in developing countries. Emission reductions generated through projects are
scrutinized by the regulator then sold on the carbon market in the form of certified
emission reductions (CERs). The importance of the CDM has increased over the last
10 years with aggregated CDM reductions expected to exceed 2.7 billion tonnes of
CO2 equivalents (UNEP/Risoe 2010). The CDM has allowed access to low-cost reduc-
tion potentials within developing countries. Yet, generally, the necessity to regulate
a project-by-project approach has resulted in high transaction costs. Typically, pro-
ject certificates are generated by comparing a hypothetical baseline emission scenario
with the realized project emission reductions. The difference is then transformed into
tradable emission credits. CDM projects, therefore, are required to go through a metic-
ulous process of scrutinization for the project itself, as well as its baseline, before being
allowed to generate credits (UNFCCC 2002). For this reason, such schemes can only
be recommended for situations where a cap-and-trade regime cannot be implemented.
2 A notable exception is Sigman and Chang (2011), identifying the basic trade-offs in incomplete enforce-
ment when integrating a credit-based regime into a cap-and-trade market.
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This was the case at the conception of the CDM, as developing countries—just as at
present—were unwilling to take binding emission reduction targets.
Within credit-based mechanisms, it is plausible that some level of information
asymmetry persists between project parties and the regulator. The baseline, for exam-
ple, should ideally represent the scenario without project implementation. Clearly, any
alternative plans for the project site are, by definition, private information, which is a
priori unobservable to the regulator. Hence, there exists an incentive to submit a base-
line scenario to the regulator, which leads to an overstatement of emission reductions,
and hence more credits. A prominent case where such a practice has been identified
ex post, is associated with a reduction of hydrofluorocarbons (HFC)—a potent green-
house gas—in China (Wara 2007, 2008). Due to incorrect estimates of cost structures
and market forecasts, baseline emissions were too generous. As a consequence, the
CDM Executive Board halted issuance for such projects and the European Commis-
sion decided to ban CERs from HFC projects within the EU ETS from 2013 onwards.3
Note that this baseline information asymmetry is hence fundamental to the issue of
additionality within the CDM: the risk that certificates might not represent actual
emission reductions.
It is also reasonable to assume that some project types are easier to identify as being
additional than others. Solar projects, for example, are—due to their relatively high per
unit cost—more likely to be additional than the reduction of industrial gases, which
can often be easily substituted by other substances.4 Furthermore, due to differences
in data quality, future developments in product markets are easier to assess in some
host countries than in others. A regulator’s monitoring strategy, then, has to take these
differences in project verifiability into account.
The risk of fraudulent non-compliance is not limited to credit-based mechanisms,
but represents, in fact, a problem for any type of environmental regulation. For exam-
ple, in a cap-and-trade emissions trading system, potential net buyers might be tempted
to report compliance with their emissions target to avoid purchasing emission cred-
its.5 Obviously, as emission permits have a positive market value, such overreporting
also benefits net sellers, which can increase their revenues from emission rights. As a
consequence, due to the risk of opportunistic misreporting, an environmental policy
needs to include an enforcement mechanism to be effective. An environmental reg-
ulator is hence mandated to ensure environmental effectiveness and carry out costly
monitoring activities in order to reduce the amount of misreporting. However, in a
resource-constrained world, monitoring and enforcement is likely to be incomplete.
For these cases, Macho-Stadler and Perez-Castrillo (2006) show that a regulator, which
discriminates between the verifiability of emission reports, should accept an arbitrarily
large amount of overreporting and opt instead for a monitoring strategy that induces
the largest portion of emitters to reduce emissions to their optimal level.6
3 See, for example, WorldBank (2011).
4 See, for example, Wara (2008, 2007).
5 A similar rationale applies in the case of a per-unit tax on emissions, as the reported emissions represent
the basis from which the overall tax burden for the regulated entity is derived.
6 Obviously, such a strategy is only necessary if the optimal amount of emissions diverges from the ‘max-
imum believable’ amount, which will be reported by most emitters in such a situation.
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For credit-based emissions trading, however, the use of such a strategy will not
minimize emissions in the overall emissions market. To see this, note that the demand
for offset credits is typically stemming from an associated cap-and-trade regime. The
CDM is, for instance, linked into both the Kyoto inter-country cap-and-trade market
and the European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS). Due to the fungibil-
ity between emission permits (e.g. EIT AAUs from EU ETS) and emission credits
(e.g. CDM CER), the latter has a positive value driven by the permit market price.
Fungibility, however, also means that an offset credit that is not backed by an actual
emission reduction, but created by fraudulent overreporting at zero cost, will crowd
out more expensive reductions within the system.7 Note further that this crowding
out is unlikely to have a large effect on prices, as cap-and-trade markets tend to be
significantly larger than the credit-based mechanisms. For example, the market vol-
ume of the EU ETS in 2010 was reported to be about 119 billion USD, while the size
of the primary CDM market amounted only to 1.5 billion USD (WorldBank 2011).
In the political discussion, the problem of erroneous or non-additional credits repre-
sents the main argument against the continuation of such schemes. However, as long
as the gains from the realized emission reductions are larger than the cost of imple-
mentation, the credit-based mechanisms will continue to play an important role when
cap-and-trade schemes are infeasible.8
The existence of the above-described crowding out of legitimate permits by erro-
neous credits requires a regulator to minimize emissions within the combined market,
which requires a different monitoring strategy than the one depicted in Macho-Stadler
and Perez-Castrillo (2006). For credit-based schemes, the regulator cannot confine
himself to guarantee efficient levels of emission reductions, but also needs to reduce
overreporting to minimize the amount of erroneous credits in the whole system. In the
following, we present a model, to derive the optimal monitoring within a credit-based
emissions trading regime.
2 The model
Consider a regulated credit-based emissions trading scheme, populated by a set of
project developers  = {1, 2, . . . , n} with cost type j = {g, b}, which choose levels
of emission reductions e at a cost c j (e) with c′j (e) > 0, c′′j (e) > 0, ∀ e. For any
level of emission reductions e, projects of type g and b differ in abatement costs by
cg(e) < cb(e) and c′g(e) < c′b(e). That is, for a given level of emissions reductions,
(marginal) abatement costs are larger for a ‘bad’ b-type than a ‘good’ g-type.9 The
7 The situation resembles a ‘market for lemons’, while differing by the fact that a credit only loses its value
if it is identified as erroneous by the regulator.
8 In the current international climate policy negotiations, creditable NAMAs (Nationally Appropriate Mit-
igation Actions) are discussed in order to incentivize emission reductions in developing countries (see, for
example, Okubo et al. (2011)).
9 This differentiation in cost types might well occur within one specific class of projects, implementing the
same type of technology. For example, two windpower generation projects designed to replace coal-based
power generation might install exactly the same type of equipment and capacity, but differences in average
wind speed at the chosen projects sites could still lead to a difference in abatement costs.
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cost functions are common knowledge whereas the cost type is private information to
the project developer. The regulator is assumed to know the relative frequency of a
g-type given by π , while a b-type occurs with converse probability (1 − π).
Where actual project reductions are fully observable and enforceable, each pro-
ject participant selects emission reductions so that c′b(e∗b) = c′g(e∗g) = p and hence
e∗b < e∗g , where p is the equilibrium permit price and e∗j is the resulting first-best
optimal level of emission reductions for type j . This represents the well-known result
that under perfect competition with complete information, marginal abatement costs
are equated to the equilibrium certificate price.
2.1 Project decision under asymmetric information
A more realistic setup is to assume that neither the project’s cost type j nor the chosen
level of emission reduction e j are directly observable by the regulator. Instead, to
receive reduction credits, the project developer submits a report over emissions reduc-
tions z j , which does not necessarily correspond to the emission level actually chosen.
Note that, with rational actors, reported emission reductions z j will never be less than
the actual reductions e j . However, as certificates command value, the developer might
be tempted to overreport emission reductions, such that z j > e j is possible. However,
given that the regulator knows (or has an adequate notion of) the cost functions and
the market price, he will never accept a report larger than e∗g , the level of ‘good’-type
reductions under full observability. While ‘bad’-type projects can mimic a ‘good’ type
in reporting, ‘good’ types are limited to simple overreporting, which would be the case
if eg < e∗g but zg = e∗g is reported.
In order to induce truthful reporting, the regulator has the possibility to monitor pro-
jects.10 We assume that even if monitored with probability 1, verifiability of the report
differs over different classes of projects. For example, the baseline of a solar project
is easier to verify than for projects reducing industrial greenhouse gases.11 To reflect
this, we assume that each class of projects is associated with a commonly observable
class-specific parameter β ∈ [0, 1], reflecting its verifiability. If β is 1 and the project
is monitored, the regulator is capable to determine, without further problems, whether
the project developer has overreported or not. As β tends to 0, the more improbable
is the success of such an assessment. For the sake of simplicity, we assume class
designator β to be uniformly distributed with density function probability function
F(β) = β and density f (β) = 1. This distribution is common knowledge.12 Given
10 In the context of the Clean Development Mechanism, the role of the regulator is taken up by the CDM
Executive Board and its supporting panels. As a consequence, the decisions of the external verifiers—the
Designated Operational Entities—are not explicitly modeled here. This simplification is justifiable on the
grounds that the CDM verification mechanism is not capable to fully deter opportunistic overreporting (Wara
2007, 2008). This incomplete deterrence can also be attributed to the fact that the DOEs are remunerated
by the project participants, potential collusion in reporting of emission reductions cannot be excluded.
11 Heyes (1994) provides further reasoning for divergence in verifiability levels. In particular, Heyes (1994)
considers the case where firms can endogenously determine their ‘inspectability’ by investing in appropriate
technologies.
12 Alternatively, the regulator can be assumed to have no information about the underlying distribution,
and assumes for lack of that knowledge, that β is uniformly distributed.
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that the class of a project is observable, the regulator can discriminate among classes
in his monitoring decision. For each project class the regulator chooses a monitoring
probability α(β), with α ∈ [0, 1]. It is assumed that this probability is known to the
project participants. For example, in reality, α would be determined by the expected
frequency of ‘spot-checks’ on each project class by the regulator.
In case overreporting is discovered, project developers are required to pay back
the revenue from overreported reductions and, in addition, pay a fine. The regulator
is assumed to make the fine contingent on the overreported amount x j , defined as
x j = z j − e j . If a project is monitored its expected penalty is hence dependent on its
verifiability class β and the overreported amount x j . We define this expected penalty
as β · θ(x j ), with θ(0) = 0, θ ′(·) > 0, θ ′′(·) > 0, and θ ′(0) > p. The assumptions
θ ′(·) > 0 and θ ′(0) > p ensure that a non-compliant developer that is caught will
always pay an amount larger than his revenue generated by overreporting, i.e., p · x .
Hence, in case of proven overreporting the developer has to return the unlawfully
acquired amount plus an additional fine. Note that this fine is increasing in the over-
reported amount, as θ ′′(·) > 0. Assuming the expected penalty to be convex in the
magnitude of the offense is quite realistic, as it seems to be in line with legal practice
under many different circumstances.13 Furthermore, it is plausible that not only the
fine, but also the probability of discovery for any project of class β is increasing and
convex in x , which would be also reflected in our formulation of the expected penalty.
For the choice of class-specific monitoring pressure α(β), we assume the regu-
lator anticipates the project participant’s optimization given the respective level of
monitoring. In order to present this choice, we first describe the project developers’
optimization over e j and z j for an unspecified level of α(β) and then discuss the
characteristics of α(β) for a regulator taking these optimal choices into account.
Note that for reasons explained above, a project developer cannot report a reduc-
tion level larger than e∗g . Given that the regulator knows the technologies that are in
the market, there exist only two plausible levels of emission reductions that can be
reported without raising the regulator’s suspicion, e∗g and e∗b .14 With these restrictions,
the developer’s optimization problem for a project of verifiability class β and cost type
j are
max{e j ,z j }
U j (e j , z j ) =
{
pz j − c j (e j ) − α(β) · β θ(z j − e j )
} (1)
subject to
zb, zg ∈
{
e∗b; e∗g
}
,
13 The assumption of convex punishment is widely used in a large part of the literature on incomplete
enforcement (Harford 1978, 1987; Sandmo 2002; Cremer and Gahvari 2002; Macho-Stadler and Perez-
Castrillo 2006). In the context of the CDM, the regulator has the power to ‘freeze’ future certificate flows—
and hence revenue—from a non-compliant project. It is hence likely that there exists a penalty beyond
simple compensation for invalidated certificates.
14 Note that the results are qualitatively similar when n > 2 costs types are used. In this case, there would
be n discontinuities.
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where p is the exogenous permit price, and e∗g and e∗b are the first-best efficient lev-
els of emission reductions for ‘good’ and ‘bad’ types, respectively. The constraint
zb, zg ∈
{
e∗b; e∗g
}
reflects that, given the developer’s optimization is known to the
regulator, only reports corresponding to optimal emission levels would signal com-
pliance. Given that under full compliance a firm would always reduce either e∗g or e∗b ,
the regulator could automatically infer from a report z /∈
{
e∗b; e∗g
}
that the project is
in non-compliance. While this inference would not reveal the degree of overreporting,
i.e. x = z−e, the regulator is capable to refuse a priori the issuance of certificates. This
is realistic, as in many real-world regimes the regulator can refuse to issue certificates
if inconsistencies in the report are discovered. Hence, while a report z /∈
{
e∗b; e∗g
}
does not trigger any penalty payment, a rational developer will always refrain from
submitting such a report, as in this case his income would be zero.15
It is taken into account within the cost function that in case overreporting is discov-
ered, project developers will have to return excess certificates and pay a fine according
to the expected progressive penalty schedule θ(x). The first-order conditions for (1)
with respect to e j are
∂Ub
∂eb
= −c′b(eb) + α(β) · β θ ′(zb − eb) = 0, (2)
∂Ug
∂eg
= −c′g(eg) + α(β) · β θ ′(zg − eg) = 0. (3)
By use of (1) to (3), we can characterize the optimal solution for different levels
of α(β). From (1), if α(β) · β = 0 the developer’s payoff is maximized at z j = e∗g
and e j = 0, that is, at the maximum possible amount of overreporting. Note that, in
principle, a regulator could infer this maximum level of non-compliance from αβ = 0,
and automatically apply the maximum sanction θ(e∗g) in such a case. However, this
would represent a sweeping judgment without proof. As we assume the regulator being
bound be the basic principles of the rule of law, we explicitly exclude the possibility of
such an inference.16 From (1), when values of αβ are close enough to 0, it is efficient
for both types to increase emission reductions while continuing to report the highest
plausible reduction, i.e. z j = e∗g . This is the case as long as
U j (e j , e∗g) > U j (e j , e∗b). (4)
It is hence to be shown at what level of α(β) both types prefer to report e∗b rather than
e∗g . Starting with ‘bad’ types, assume, for a moment, that (4) holds at the level of α(β)
15 An alternative procedure would be to assume that such an inference is for some reason not feasible.
In these cases, as shown in Macho-Stadler and Perez-Castrillo (2006) and Ohndorf (2010), non-compli-
ant agents would, with increasing αβ, first report the maximum plausible level of abatement and reduce
emissions until C ′(e) = p. Only when e = e∗ is reached, will the report z begin to reduce toward full
compliance (z = e∗). Note, however, that there exists in fact no reason to a priori assume the infeasibility
of the inference depicted above.
16 In the context of the CDM, the regulator is indeed bound by these principles, as it has to answer to the
Conference of the Parties of the Kyoto Protocol (UNFCCC 2002, Decision 17, Annex, para. 5.).
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at which b-types are induced to choose their first-best level of emissions (eb = e∗b).
Then, from (2) and noticing c′b(e∗b) = p, we can derive a threshold level αˆ(β) at which
zb = e∗g and eb = e∗b , which is defined as
αˆ(β) ≡ p
β · θ ′(e∗g − e∗b)
.
Interestingly, at auditing pressure αˆ(β) condition (4) is indeed fulfilled for b-types,
as the latter requires
α(β) <
p · (e∗g − e∗b)
βθ(e∗g − e∗b)
. (5)
It is easy to see that this condition always holds at αˆ(β), as penalty βθ(·) is assumed
to be convex. Hence ‘bad’-type projects will continue to pretend to be of ‘good’ type
by choosing zb = e∗g . Given c′g(e∗b) < c′b(e∗b) = p, condition (4) will also always
hold for ‘good’ type projects, such that ‘good’ types will always report their first-best
levels, i.e. zg = e∗g .
Interestingly, at αˆ(β) inequality (5) is strict. With further increases in α(β) there
exists a range within which ‘bad’ type project developers will choose to further
increase emission reductions beyond the first-best levels e∗g instead of choosing to
report truthfully: there exists a range of ‘over-reduction’, up to a level eb > e∗b , at
which Ub(eb, e∗g) = U j (e∗b, e∗b). From this we can derive another threshold αˇ(β)
defined as follows
αˇ(β) ≡ p · (e
∗
g − e∗b)
βθ(e∗g − eb)
.
Threshold αˇ(β) represents the minimum audit probability that induces a report
zb = e∗b , i.e. truthful reporting of a b-type. Note, this probability level is only feasible
if αˇ ≤ 1. We denote the lowest feasible level of verifiability with βˇ, where αˇ(βˇ) = 1,
which is defined by
βˇ ≡ p · (e
∗
g − e∗b)
θ(e∗g − e)
.
Finally, as ‘good’ types will always report zg = e∗g , full compliance of g-type
projects are obtained for levels of α high enough to implement eg = e∗g . Again, the
threshold α˜(β) that implements truthful reporting of a g-type can be derived from (3)
and by taking into account c′g(e∗g) = p, α˜(β) is defined as
α˜(β) ≡ p
βθ ′(0)
.
Again, this probability level is only feasible if α˜ ≤ 1, i.e. β ≥ β˜, where β˜ is defined
by α˜(β˜) = 1. Threshold β˜ is hence
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Fig. 1 Reported and actual emission reductions for both cost types
β˜ ≡ p
θ ′(0)
.
Note that under the above-made assumptions, for any given β, αˆ(β) < αˇ(β) <
α˜(β). Hence, there exists full compliance for all projects for which α(β) ∈ [α˜, 1].
Summarizing the above-made considerations, Fig. 1 depicts the compliance behavior
of ‘good’- and ‘bad’-type projects in dependence of monitoring probability α.
2.2 Regulator’s optimal monitoring policy with an unlimited budget
Given the optimizing behavior of project participants, a regulator needs to identify
an optimal monitoring strategy.17 In order to model the monitoring decision with an
existing project pool, the regulator is assumed to face a population of already reg-
istered projects. For simplicity, the cost of monitoring one project is normalized to
one. Aggregated monitoring cost cannot transgress the regulator’s monitoring budget,
denoted with B.
Without discovery of non-compliance, a project is issued emission reduction cer-
tificates corresponding to its reported amount z j . As explained in Sect. 1.1, credits
not backed by actual emission reductions are non-additional and hence reduce the
17 For a discussion on how regulatory attitudes alter monitoring policy and environmental innovation, see
the recent work of Heyes and Kapur (2011).
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environmental integrity of the overall carbon market. The regulator minimizing emis-
sions in the integrated system can hence not confine himself to maximize aggregated
emission reductions, but also has to take the problem of overreporting into account.
Hence, the objective of the enforcement agency within the setup presented here is to
minimize aggregated overreporting, while maximizing emission reductions.
As depicted in Fig. 1, for small α and any given β a change in monitoring pressure
only influences emission reductions e j , while z j remains—for both cost types—at
its corner solution e∗g . For b-type projects, a further increase in α will only lead to an
adjustment of zb to its truthful level e∗b after the emission reductions have reached their
optimal level. As for g-types, the corner solution for zg is equal to e∗g , where over-
reporting is only reduced to zero if the emission reductions reach exactly this level.
This behavior of the project developers simplifies the formulation of the regulator’s
objective function. If the regulator minimizes weighted aggregations of overreporting
x j = z j − e j over all classes of β, he will also achieve a maximization of emis-
sion reductions. Hence, the enforcement agency chooses the monitoring schedule
(α(β))β∈[0,1] that solves the following program.
min
∫ 1
0
(
π(e∗g − eg(αβ)) + (1 − π)(zb(αβ) − eb(αβ))
)
dβ (6)
such that
∫ 1
0
α(β) n dβ ≤ B (7)
and
eg(β) ∈ argmax
{
Ug(eg)
}
, (8)
eb(β), zb(β) ∈ argmax {Ub(eb, zb)} . (9)
To choose an optimal monitoring scheme, the agency needs to take into account its
budget constraint (7), and the profit maximization of the project participants (8) and
(9). Within this subsection we only consider the latter two constraints to be binding.
We denote the minimum budget incentivizing maximum emission reductions by B¯,
which is defined by:
B¯ ≡ β˜ n +
∫ 1
β˜
α˜(β) n dβ. (10)
Proposition 1 immediately follows:
Proposition 1 When B ≥ B¯ the cost-minimizing agency sets an audit policy that
satisfies α(β) = 1, for β ∈ [0, βˇ) and α(β) ∈ [αˇ(β), 1] for β ∈ [βˇ, 1].
Proposition 1 confirms similar findings to the case with emissions taxes. When a
scheme includes projects with large information asymmetries between project partic-
ipants and the regulator, an increase in budget does not necessarily lead to a reduction
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in overreporting. As soon as the budget level B¯ is reached, the marginal rate of deter-
rence equals zero. Hence, even if a maximization of reductions is the only objective
of the agency, efficiency requires that the auditing budget of the regulator should be
capped at B¯.
3 Monitoring with a limited budget
In practice, it is likely that the number of audits performed by the regulator is con-
strained by his budget. It is hence realistic to assume that the budget constraint (7) of
the regulator’s optimization problem is binding. Thus, in the following it is assumed
that B ≤ B¯.
Within a budget-constrained optimization, the regulator needs to decide which β
classes should experience an increase in spot-check frequency to obtain the largest
decrease in overall emissions. As the regulator cannot observe a project’s cost type,
the expected amount of overreporting by a project of class β for a given level of α,
denoted by β(α), is
β(α) =
(
π(e∗g − eg(αβ)) + (1 − π)(zb(αβ) − eb(αβ))
)
. (11)
For any two projects with class β1 and β2, a shift in monitoring effort of 	α from
project class 1 to project class 2 is (weakly) efficient if
[
β2(α2 + 	α) − β2(α2)
] − [β1(α1) − β1((α1 − 	α))
]
(≥) > 0, (12)
with
β(α) =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
e∗g, for α(β) = 0,
π(e∗g−eg(αβ))+(1−π)(e∗g−eb(αβ)), for 0 < α(β) < αˇ(β),
π(e∗g−eg(αβ)), for αˇ(β) ≤ α(β) < α˜(β),
0, for α˜(β) ≤ α(β) ≤ 1,
(13)
where the case separation in (13) is determined through the optimal reaction of the
project developer. An auditing schedule (α(β))β∈[0,1] is efficient if (12) holds for any
arbitrary pairwise comparison of two different project types.
Hence, determining the optimal auditing policy involves a trade-off in monitor-
ing pressure in the range 0 < α < α˜. Note that β(α) is discontinuous at αˇ(β), i.e.
the threshold at which b-types start to truthfully report zb = e∗b . Above and below
this threshold level, β(α) is differentiable with respect to α. The derivative of  can
be derived from (2), (11), and (13) by applying the Implicit Function Theorem. The
corresponding derivative is:
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dβ
dα
=
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
β ·
(
π ·θ ′(e∗g−eg(αβ))
c′′g(eg(αβ))+αβθ ′′(e∗g−eg(αβ))
+ (1−π)·θ ′(e∗g−eb(αβ))
c′′b (eb(αβ))+αβθ ′′(e∗g−eb(αβ))
)
, for α < αˇ(β),
β π · θ ′(e∗g−eg(αβ))
c′′g(eg(αβ))+αβθ ′′(e∗g−eg(αβ)) , for αˇ(β) ≤ α ≤ α˜(β),
0, for α > α˜(β),
(14)
which is used to derive the following proposition.
Proposition 2 Under a limited budget B < B, optimal monitoring policy implies
that there exists a threshold βl(B) > 0, such that the regulator chooses α = 0 for
β ≤ βl(B). Projects with β > βl(B) will always be monitored with α > 0.
Proof See appendix. 	unionsq
Proposition 2 states that there exists a threshold level βl(B) where lower verifiable
projects will not be monitored, whereas all other projects will receive a positive prob-
ability of monitoring. This threshold tends to decrease with larger levels of budget B,
but will always exist for B < B. This is in line with the optimal monitoring under an
emissions tax, presented in Macho-Stadler and Perez-Castrillo (2006).
Due to the discontinuity at αˇ(β) = p·(e∗g−e∗b)
β θ(e∗g−eb) in (14), optimal monitoring cannot
be simply assessed via an equalization of the derivatives ddα for different levels of
β, as we must take into consideration the change in expected overreporting  that
occur exactly at this discontinuity. In particular, for any β, the gain from monitoring
a b-type when increasing α(β) from 0 to αˇ(β), is e∗g , which consists of emissions
reduction e∗b as well as the reduction in over-reporting e∗g − e∗b . For g-type projects,
the same increase in monitoring pressure yields an increase in emission reductions of
eg(αˇ(β) ·β) = eg(1 · βˇ). Thus, the expected gains per unit of α from spending exactly
αˇ(β) for any level of β > βˇ, designated with D(β) are:
D(β) = π eg(βˇ) + (1 − π) e
∗
g
αˇ(β)
= β θ(e
∗
g − eb)
p · (e∗g − e∗b)
· (e∗g − π(e∗g − eg(βˇ))). (15)
Obviously, from (12), it is safe to state that the regulator will choose at least αˇ(β)
for a specific project type β, if D(β) is larger than any ddα at all other combinations of
α(β) and β. Note from (14) that the largest marginal benefit in reduction of overre-
porting is at α = 0, β = 1. On the other hand, the minimum (feasible) level of αˇ(β)
lies at β = βˇ. This allows us to establish a sufficient condition for which it is always
efficient to incentivize truthful reporting of ‘bad’ types for projects with β ∈
[
βˇ, 1
]
:
D(βˇ) >
d1(0)
dα
⇐⇒ πeg(βˇ) + (1 − π)e∗g > θ ′(e∗g)
(
π
c′′g(0)
+ 1 − π
c′′b(0)
)
. (16)
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In order to assess the conditions under which (16) holds we introduce a measure
γ , representing the relative frequency of a b-type in relation to g-type projects:
γ ≡ 1 − π
π
. (17)
Obviously, the larger γ , the more imminent is the problem of asymmetric informa-
tion over reduction costs. This allows us to reformulate (16) as follows:
γ >
c′′b(0)
c′′g(0)
· c
′′
g(0) e(βˇ) − θ ′(0)
θ ′(0) − c′′b(0)e∗g
. (18)
For a large enough share of b-type projects in the market, the regulator will always
use his budget to induce truthful reporting within b-type projects in the verifiability
classes, where this is possible, i.e. for β ≥ βˇ. As it is sensible to consider situations
with an imminent problem of asymmetric information over types, we assume (18) to
hold throughout the rest of this paper. Based on this assumption, the following prop-
osition can be established immediately by noting (7), and the equivalence of (16) and
(18):
Proposition 3 If (18) holds, then
(i) If B > αˇ(1) · n , there exists a βm ≥ βl , such that zb = e∗b for all β ≥ βm. The
value of βm is non-decreasing in B.
(ii) For B = ∫ 1
β0
αˇ(β) n dβ with βˇ < β0 < 1, the regulator will incentivize truth-
ful reporting for bad type projects, by choosing an audit pressure of αˇ for all
projects with β ≥ β0. Projects with β < β0 will not be monitored. Hence,
βm = βl = β0.
(iii) For B ≥ ∫ 1
βˇ
αˇ(β) n dβ the regulator will always incentivize truthful report-
ing for bad type projects over the range of projects where this is possible, i.e.
β ∈ [βˇ, 1].
Proposition 3 further specifies the characteristics of an optimal monitoring schedule
for credit-based systems. Proposition 3 (i), establishes the existence of a threshold level
βm where full compliance of ‘bad’ types is induced for larger β. When the monitoring
budget becomes larger than that required to ensure full compliance in the class easiest
to verify (i.e. β = 1), the regulator will induce zb = e∗b , starting with highest levels of
β and continuing to do so for decreasing β, as long as this is feasible within the given
budget. It is hence optimal to refrain from monitoring projects of lower levels of β.
This is shown within Proposition 3 (ii), where for the sake of simplicity, no residual
budget exists.18 Finally, Proposition 3 (iii) explains that if the budget is sufficiently
large to enable the regulator to induce zb = e∗b for all classes where this is feasible, it
is indeed optimal to do so.
Given these insights, the question arises of how larger budgets should be allocated,
which go beyond the level necessary to induce truthful compliance of ‘bad’ types for
18 For the sake of brevity we refrain from an extensive exposition on the use of the residual budget. Note,
however, that this optimal use can be easily inferred from Propositions 4–8 below.
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β ∈
[
βˇ, 1
]
. In these cases, the regulator has to compare the marginal gains associated
with increased audit pressure on project classes where β < βˇ and β > βˇ. That is, is it
more efficient to add additional monitoring pressure to projects with lower or higher
verifiability? Lower levels of β will be certainly monitored if
d
βˇ
(0)
dα
>
d1(αˇ(1))
dα
. (19)
By use of condition (19), definition (17), and noting that αˇ(1) = βˇ, we can derive
the following proposition:
Proposition 4 If B > ∫ 1
βˇ
αˇ(β) n dβ and
γ > c′′b(0)
[
θ ′(βˇ)
βˇθ ′(e∗)(c′′g(βˇ) + βˇ · θ ′′(βˇ))
− 1
c′′g(0)
]
(20)
then βl < βˇ.
Proposition 4 establishes a sufficient condition for which, with the existence of a
larger budget, it is optimal to use at least some of the resources to apply monitoring
pressure to those projects with β < βˇ. As stated in condition (20), this is the case if
the probability of a b-type occurring is sufficiently large.
We now investigate a case where it might be efficient to, instead, increase auditing
pressure for those projects where β > βˇ. This is surely the case if inducing full com-
pliance for all β ≥ β˜ yields a higher marginal gain than starting to induce positive
pressure, at levels β < βˇ. Hence, a sufficient condition for increased monitoring at
levels higher than βˇ is
d
βˇ
(0)
dα
<
dβ˜(1)
dα
. (21)
From (7) and (21), we can derive the following proposition:
Proposition 5 If ∫ 1
βˇ
αˇ(β) n dβ < B ≤ ∫ β˜
βˇ
αˇ(β) n dβ + ∫ 1
β˜
α˜(β) n dβ and
γ < c′′b(0)
[
p
βˇc′′g(e∗g)θ ′(e∗g) + β˜βˇθ ′(e∗g)θ ′′(0)
− 1
c′′g(0)
]
(22)
then βl = βm = βˇ.
Proposition 5 establishes sufficient conditions for which the regulator will refrain
from monitoring projects with verifiability lower than βˇ. This is obviously the case
if the share of g-type projects is not too low. This is intuitive, as ‘bad’ types with
β ≥ βˇ are already in compliance. A low share of ‘good’ types would hence imply
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that the additional gains from increasing monitoring pressure on projects with high
verifiability will be low.
Note, however, that for the budget range given in Proposition 5 it is not guaranteed
that there exists a verifiability class for which g-type projects are in full compliance.
Sufficient conditions for this being the case are established in the following proposi-
tion:
Proposition 6 For a large enough budget B, there exists a βh > βm where zg = e∗g
and zb = e∗b for all β ≥ βh.
(i) For βl < βm threshold βh exists if βh = f (βl) ≤ 1 with
f (βl) =
(
πc′′b(0) + (1 − π)c′′g(0)
) θ ′(e∗g)
(
c′′g(e∗g)θ ′(0)+p θ ′′(0)
)
π c′′b (0) c′′g(0)θ ′(0)2
· βl .
(ii) For βl = βm, a sufficient condition for the existence of βh is
B ≥
∫ β0
βˇ
αˇ(β) n dβ +
∫ 1
β0
α˜(β) n dβ
for any β0 for which βˇ < β0 ≤
θ ′(0)
(
c′′g(eg(βˇ))+βˇθ ′′(e∗g−eg(βˇ))
)
θ ′(e∗g−eg(βˇ))
(
c′′g(e∗g)+β˜θ ′′(0)
)
Proof See appendix. 	unionsq
If the budget is large enough, the regulator is able to incentivize full compliance
for all types with β larger or equal to the threshold level βh . The budget level required
for the existence of βh is dependent on whether the regulator chooses to also put a
positive monitoring pressure on classes of projects lower than βˇ. If this is the case,
it is possible via the comparison of slopes to express the level of βh as a function of
the threshold βl , which is expressed in Proposition 6 (i). If βl = βˇ, a lower amount
of budget is required for the existence of βh . Sufficient conditions for the budget level
required for the existence are given in Proposition 6 (ii).
Given that threshold classes βˆ, βˇ, and β˜ can be derived from the individual opti-
mization of project developers, a budget close enough to B, automatically ensures
the existence of all three thresholds—βl , βm , and βh—within the optimal monitoring
schedule. It remains to discuss the general features of the optimal monitoring schedule
(α(β))β∈[0,1] between those thresholds. For βl = βm , α(β) is increasing between both
thresholds, as α(βl) = 0, while monitoring pressure for β close enough to βm is strictly
positive. Furthermore, for levels larger than βh , optimal monitoring α(β) is strictly
decreasing, as α˜(β) is decreasing in β, and no additional reduction in overreporting
can be achieved by choosing α > α˜(β).
The characteristics of optimal monitoring between βm and βh are less clear. On
the one hand, we assume that—provided a large enough budget—all projects with
β ≥ βˇ will be monitored with at least probability αˇ(β). Given that αˇ(β) is decreasing
in β, there exists a tendency for decreasing auditing pressure within [βm ; βh]. Yet,
there might exist also a tendency to increase auditing pressure for higher levels of β
if ∂2
∂α∂β
> 0. Note, however, that this is surely not the case if ddα is strictly decreas-
ing in β. An interesting case arises then if the budget is large enough for βh = β˜,
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as αˇ(βˇ) = α˜(β˜) = 1. Hence, in this case if ∂2
∂α∂β
< 0 all project classes in [βˇ; β˜]
will also be monitored with probability 1. We summarize this insight in the following
proposition.
Proposition 7 For a budget large enough to implement βh = β˜ and if ∂2()∂α∂β < 0 in[βm, βh], the regulator chooses α(β) = 1 for β ∈ [βm, βh].
The explicit form of cross-derivative ∂2
∂α∂β
in the range [βm, βh] is obtained by
taking the derivative of the middle term of (14) with respect to β, which yields
∂2
∂α∂β
= πθ ′(x) ·
c′′g(e(αβ))2 − αβ
(
αβθ ′′(x)2 + θ ′(x)
(
c′′′g (e(αβ)) − αβθ ′′′(x)
))
(
c′′g(e(αβ)) + αβθ ′′(x)
)3 ,
(23)
where x = e∗g − eg(αβ). Note that the cross-derivative might indeed be larger or
smaller than zero, and could even switch signs over the range [βm, βh]. From (23), the
sign depends on the structure of both c(·) and θ(·). In particular, for relatively large
θ ′′(x) and θ ′′′(x), the compliance incentive is larger than the deviation incentive and
the cross-derivative is negative. That is, for a relatively ‘stringent’ (‘lax’) penalty pol-
icy, ∂2
∂α∂β
< 0 ( ∂2
∂α∂β
> 0). Hence, Proposition 7 only applies if the penalty schedule
is ‘stringent’, compared to abatement costs. Note, however, that the opposite case,
relatively ‘lax’ penalties, is just as conceivable. For this case an interesting feature of
optimal auditing in [βm, βh] can be derived, which is summarized in Proposition 8.
Proposition 8 For an existing βh and ∂
2
∂α∂β
> 0 in [βˇ, βh], there exists a
βmin =
θ ′(0)
(
c′′g(eg(βˇ)) + βˇθ ′′(e∗g − eg(βˇ))
)
θ ′(e∗g − eg(βˇ))
(
c′′g(e∗g) + β˜θ ′′(0)
) · βh (24)
for which the optimal monitoring pressure α(β) is decreasing in the interval [βˇ, βmin]
and increasing in the interval [βmin, β˜] if the budget is too small to allow for α(β) = 1
within this range.
Proof See appendix. 	unionsq
Somewhat counter-intuitively, it is feasible that for levels of β between [βˇ, β˜],
optimal monitoring pressure is not always decreasing in β. In particular, it is possible
that a ‘U-shaped’ monitoring pressure exists within the range [βˇ, β˜]. The details of
this behavior are shown formally in the mathematical appendix. As condition (18) is
assumed to hold, the regulator will for all β ≥ βˇ at least implement auditing pressure
αˇ(β) which is decreasing in β. Hence, for lower β in [βˇ, βh], optimal monitoring is
decreasing. Yet, if ∂2
∂α∂β
> 0, i.e. if penalties are ‘lax’, further increases in auditing
pressure for larger β also yield larger gains from auditing. In fact, for higher levels of
β the relative influence of monitoring α on the expected penalty is larger under a ‘lax’
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(a) (b)
Fig. 2 Optimal monitoring with lower (case a) and larger (case b) monitoring budgets
penalty schedule than under a ‘stringent’ one. Hence, in the former case, it is optimal
to further increase monitoring pressure as soon as β is large enough (i.e. larger than
βmin).
Note, for the often-assumed quadratic forms of abatement cost and penalty func-
tions, with constant second derivatives c′′ and θ ′′, cross-derivative ∂2
∂α∂β
is positive
(negative) iff
αβ < (>)
c′′
θ ′′
. (25)
Hence, with quadratic functions, the general shape of optimal monitoring only
depends on the relative convexities of abatement costs and the penalty schedule.
The findings established in Propositions 2–8 are represented in Fig. 2, which shows
possible optimal monitoring strategies of a regulator with a limited budget. Begin by
looking at Fig. 2a, depicting a case with a relatively narrow budget constraint. From
Proposition 2, zero monitoring pressure will be applied for those projects with β < βl .
Furthermore, as the regulator applies auditing pressure αˇ(β) for all projects where this
is possible (Proposition 3) and αˇ′(β) < 0, there exists a βm with α(β) decreasing in
the range [βm; 1]. Depending on the relative frequency of good- and bad-type projects,
the left hand branch of the optimal monitoring schedule (i.e. for β < βm) might either
exist (Proposition 4) or not (Proposition 5).
Figure 2b represents cases for budgets large enough for βh to exist (Proposition
6). In this case the left hand branch i.e. α(β) for β < βm , is more likely to exist.
Furthermore, for all depicted cases monitoring pressure decreases from βh onwards,
as with increasing verifiability β, lower levels of monitoring are required to induce full
compliance of both types (i.e. α˜′(β) < 0). The qualitative difference in monitoring in
the depicted cases α1(β), and α2(β) are hence with respect to the optimal schedule in
the range [βm;βh]. As laid out above, these cases are easiest to interpret if we assume
penalty and cost functions to be quadratic.
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Monitoring schedule α1(β) represents the case of a larger budget with relatively
strict monitoring (Proposition 7). Hence, in this case, projects with intermediate levels
of verifiability are monitored with probability 1. With a comparatively ‘lax’ penalty
scheme and an intermediate budget, optimal monitoring is ‘U-shaped’ between βm
and βh , as established in Proposition 8. Given an intermediate budget, and the mar-
ginal gains of emissions reductions for a change in α are increasing in verifiability, an
incentive exists to increase monitoring pressure in verifiability level from βmin to βh .
This case is represented by monitoring schedule α2(β).
Note that provided a large enough budget, the above depicted optimal monitoring
strategy will generally lead to a mixed equilibrium with respect to separation of cost
types. For budgets large enough to ensure the existence of βm , there will be pooling of
cost types situated below that threshold, and full separation otherwise. This is due to
the fact that a bad-type project will only mimic a good-type project if the correspond-
ing auditing pressure is α(β) < αˇ(β). For all cases where α(β) ≥ αˇ(β), bad-type
projects will truthfully report zb = e∗b , there is hence full separation of types.19
4 Regulation with project admission
The existence of the different thresholds identified above suggests an interesting exten-
sion of the regulator’s set of instruments to reduce overreporting within credit-based
mechanisms. In addition to monitoring, the regulator could exclude project types with
low levels of verifiability from the mechanism. Within the CDM for example, the
regulator can refuse the admission of a project if the Project Design Document or the
proposed Baseline Method do not correspond to the specified standards.20 It is hence
quite plausible that project admission standards could also include a minimum level
of verifiability.
The above-presented model results can be used to gain valuable insights for deter-
mining sensible cut-off levels for project admission. In the context of this model, the
regulator would have to decide on a maximum tolerable level of opportunistic mis-
reporting given a specified budget. In most theoretical contributions on incomplete
enforcement of environmental policy instruments, the regulator is assumed to mini-
mize emissions in the regulated system. As far as climate change is concerned, this
definition of the regulator’s objective seems sensible. In light of the fact that there
exists no consensus on the allocatively optimal level of emission reductions, deter-
mining a specific cut-off level based on welfare considerations would be particularly
problematic. As long as the exact level of the social cost of carbon is still disputed,
the optimal regulation under incomplete enforcement remains just as undetermined as
the optimal level of abatement.
19 Note that given that the regulator’s choice is limited to auditing pressure α—which is to be applied
before the cost type is known—there exist no additional devices to induce further separation of types for
projects with β ∈ [0;βm ]. In principle, an additional increase in the wedge between the expected payoffs
of both types could be obtained by conditioning penalty θ(x) on the cost type. However, such an increase
in the penalty for (discovered) bad types would only lead to a shift of the thresholds βl (B) and βm (B) to
the left, while all our qualitative results would continue to hold.
20 The probability of rejection for a submitted CDM project is about 5 percent (UNEP/Risoe 2010).
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Yet, the CDM remains a matter of political dispute. Even in the potential buyer
countries, the use of Certified Emission Reductions for meeting the Kyoto targets is
not undisputed, as some observers still challenge the morality of reducing emissions
in third-world countries. As a consequence, the sudden discovery of large scale fraud
within a CDM project would significantly undermine the credibility of the whole Kyoto
emissions trading regime as an instrument to achieve emission reductions. Hence, it
is plausible that the architects of the mechanism might want to minimize the risk of
discovery of fraud by reducing the range of eligible projects. The objective of min-
imizing emissions within the combined markets would then imply a ‘no-tolerance’
constraint, excluding any amount of overreporting within the credit-based system. In
the framework presented above, such a policy would exclude all projects with a verifi-
ability lower than the minimum implementable βh(B). In this case all projects would
be in perfect compliance.
A ‘no-tolerance’ policy would result if program (6) were optimized simultaneously
over α(β) and project admission cut-off level βh(B). Obviously, with a large enough
budget, i.e. B ≥ Bˇ = ∫ 1
β˜
α˜(β)dβ, the regulator would simply restrict the set of eligible
projects to the ones for which β ≥ β˜ and monitor these projects with the correspond-
ing pressure of α˜(β). For those cases where B < Bˇ, the corresponding cut-off value
would have to be higher, as the monitoring budget constraint becomes binding. As a
consequence, the amount of eligible projects is further restricted. Note that for such a
regime, the regulator’s monitoring schedule will not be subject to an actual optimiza-
tion, as for each class of β the optimal monitoring policy is already known to be α˜(β).
Hence, the regulator’s decision is reduced to determining the cut-off level for project
admission βh for which
B =
∫ 1
βh
α˜(β) n dβ. (26)
Another intuitively sensible cut off-level would be βm(B), implying that overre-
porting is only deterred for less efficient projects, while some amount of ‘shirking’,
in the reduction of more efficient projects, would still be possible. This less restrictive
cut-off level might be acceptable if the regulator also had to guarantee a large enough
market volume for the credit-based regime.
The above-made considerations could also be extended to take into account that
incomplete enforcement can also exist on the associated cap-and-trade market, as in
Sigman and Chang (2011). In this case, the amount of overreporting allowed within
the credit-based regime might be adjusted to the corresponding share of non-compli-
ance within the cap-and-trade market. This would require a combined model of both
markets, which represents an interesting extension for future research.
5 Conclusion
The model presented within this paper allows some interesting insights into the nature
of optimal monitoring for credit-based systems, like the Clean Development Mecha-
nism. It was shown that under these circumstances even with an unlimited monitoring
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budget, overreporting of reductions can not be completely disincentivized. The more
interesting and realistic results are, however, achieved when the regulator is assumed
to be constrained in both its budget and the information it holds on regulated emitters.
While under an unlimited budget all projects with positive verifiability will be mon-
itored, the situation significantly changes under the assumption of a budget constraint.
For this case, it is shown that a rational regulator will completely refrain from monitor-
ing those projects that are most difficult to verify. For the range of verifiability for which
all projects are in full compliance, optimal monitoring decreases in verifiability. Both
results are in line with the findings by Macho-Stadler and Perez-Castrillo (2006) who
analyze incomplete enforcement of emission taxes without asymmetric information
on costs. However, unlike emission taxes, the general principle of credit-based emis-
sion trading systems implies that the regulator cannot refrain to simply maximize the
actual emission reductions but needs also to reduce the level of overstatement within
the projects’ reported reductions. This is due to the fact that certificates issued on the
basis of the reports will be used to offset actual emissions elsewhere. Hence, contrary
to the the tax case, the regulator needs to minimize the overall level of overreporting.
Due to differences in the objective function of the regulator as well as the asymmet-
ric information on cost types, the optimal monitoring strategy derived above signifi-
cantly differs from those proposed in the context of emission taxes or a cap-and-trade
system. First, with a large enough share of projects with high abatement costs, the
regulator has an incentive to induce full compliance for these cost types over the
whole range of verifiability where this is possible. Second, with decreasing verifiabil-
ity, the optimal audit pressure features a ‘jump’ downwards when reaching levels of
verifiability, for which the regulator cannot deter overreporting by high-cost projects.
Third, for projects with intermediate verifiability, optimal monitoring pressure can
be either non-increasing or ‘U-shaped’, depending on the relative stringency of the
penalty schedule.
As the importance of credit-based mechanisms grows, attention is turning to the
optimal implementation and regulation of such schemes: something this paper has
attempted to address. Interesting avenues for further investigation include the intro-
duction of uncertainty over costs and plausible reduction levels, the analysis of com-
bined asymmetric information problems within cap-and-trade and credit schemes, as
well as further optimal project admission (‘cut-off’) policies.
Mathematical appendix
Proof of Proposition 2:
For β → 0, dβdα , given by equation (14), approaches 0 as well, as the bracketed term
in the first line is never infinitely large for e ∈ [0, e∗g]. Hence, according to condition
(12), for β1 < β2, reducing α1 to 0 is always efficient for β1 small enough. Further-
more, it is easy to check that for α = 0 the the bracketed term in the first line of (14) is
increasing in β. Hence, it follows from condition (12) that all projects with β > βl(B)
are monitored with positive probability. 	unionsq
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Proof of Proposition 6:
(i) If βl < βm it follows from (12) that βh only exists if
∂βh (α˜(βh))
∂α
= ∂βl (0)
∂α
. (27)
After substitution of (14) into (27) for the respective values and rearranging, βh
can be expressed as βh = f (βl), where f (βl) is defined as in Proposition 6 i).
Hence, as β ∈ [0; 1], βh exists if f (βl) ≤ 1.
(ii) If βl = βm it follows from (12) that for the existence of the largest possible βh ,
i.e. βh = 1, the budget is at least to be large enough to allow for some βy ≥ βˇ the
equalization of slopes as follows
∂1(α˜(1))
∂α
= ∂βy (αˇ(βy))
∂α
. (28)
Noticing that α˜(1) = β˜ and αˇ(βy) = βˇ, substituting (14) into (28) and solving
for βy yields
βy =
θ ′(0)
(
c′′g(eg(βˇ)) + βˇθ ′′(e∗g − eg(βˇ))
)
θ ′(e∗g − eg(βˇ))
(
c′′g(e∗g) + β˜θ ′′(0)
) (29)
the upper boundary of β0 in Proposition 6 ii). Hence, if the budget level is high
enough to apply monitoring pressure α˜(β) for all β ≥ β0, βh will necessarily
exist. 	unionsq
Proof of Proposition 8:
Note that if βh exists, βm = βˇ, as (18) is assumed to hold. For an existing βh , condition
(12) requires that any β0 > βˇ will be monitored with αˇ(β0) if
∂βh (α˜(βh))
∂α
≥ ∂β0(αˇ(β0))
∂α
, (30)
For condition (30) holding with equality, β0 = βmin , as defined in Proposition 8.
Note that βmin > βˇ if
βh · θ
′(0)
c′′g(e∗g) + β˜θ ′′(0)
> βˇ · θ
′(e∗g − eg(βˇ))
c′′g(eg(βˇ)) + βˇθ ′′(e∗g − eg(βˇ))
⇐⇒ ∂βh (α˜(βh))
∂α
>
∂
βˇ
(αˇ(βˇ))
∂α
, (31)
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which is always the case for ∂2
∂α∂β
. As αˇ(β) is strictly decreasing in β optimal moni-
toring α(β) is also decreasing in the range [βˇ;βmin].
It remains to show that α(β) is increasing in β within the range [βmin;βh]. First,
note that condition (12) requires
∂βh (α˜(βh))
∂α
= ∂β0(αˇ(β0))
∂α
, (32)
for any β0 ∈ [βmin;βh]. Note further that
d2
d2α
=
πβ2θ ′(x)
(
−2c′′g(eg(αβ))θ ′′(x) − 2αβθ ′′(x)2 + θ ′(x)
(
−c′′′g (eg(αβ)) + αβθ ′′′(x)
))
(
c′′g(eg(αβ)) + αβθ ′′(x)
)3 ,
(33)
where x = e∗g − eg(αβ). Through comparison of enumerators of (23) and (33) it is
easy to see that if ∂2
∂α∂β
> 0 then d2d2α < 0. Hence, condition (32) can only hold if α(β)
is increasing over the range [βmin;βh]. 	unionsq
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